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to the system posed by the gifting of binding force to such commercial agree-
ments between the parties.
At its conclusion the book returns to the basic issues of party consent to agree-
ments on jurisdiction and choice of law.We are presented with a restatement of
the common law principles established and/or argued for throughout the text.
There then follows a brief, unenthusiastic, overview of the Hague Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements. Professor Briggs then returns to the important
issue of the role of the judge and draws an analogy between the role of the com-
mon law judge and that of an umpire. The point of the analogy is to stress the
particular nature of the judicial role in the adjudication of disputes in the common
law and to raise the possibility of an irrevocable adjudicatory di¡erence between
the common law and ‘the’ civil law. In truth little more than a sketch is attempted
at this point, which is both a shame for the instant reader and a spur to other
authors. The book ends with a reprise of the author’s basic point concerning the
interaction of Private International Law and party autonomy when manifested as
consent to a forum or to a law: that a court which accepts the evidence of such an
agreement and directly or indirectly holds an individual to it does no violence to
the procedural superstructure which is embodied by Private International Law.
Thismost valuable bookmay be recommended to all concernedwith the prac-
tice, study or adjudication of issues arising from agreements concerning jurisdic-
tion and choice of law.
Jonathan Fitchenn
Lorenzo Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas: Con£icts of Fundamental Legal
Rights in Europe and the USA, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 188
pp, hb d50.00.
Ongoing constitutional debates over fundamental issues such as abortion law and
the right to life, protection of privacy and freedom of speech have recently
attracted much interest. Zucca’s Constitutional Dilemmas brings fresh analysis to
these well established narratives by setting them in a comparative context. The
text has two main contentions: ¢rst, that constitutional dilemmas are axiomatic
elements of amodern and dynamic constitutional system; and second, that a legal
system’s claim to authority depends on clear epistemic practices and assumptions
adopted to accommodate them in a quasi-coherent legal system.These two argu-
ments are developed by adopting an inductivemethodologywhich begins bydis-
cussing the meta-legal assumptions which inform modern rights doctrines and
then moves on to a second section where some of the contentions presented on
the ¢rst part are discussed from a comparative perspective.While the ¢rst section
makes some interesting claims, the second is more convincing.
The comparative analysis is excellent. Zucca adopts a quasi-legal realist
approach which ties together a series of well constructed arguments and detailed
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technical analyses. From this perspective, Constitutional Dilemmas o¡ers a number
of very careful legal evaluations which clarify di¡erences and similarities between
di¡erent constitutional systems. However, much of the text’s epistemic strength is
dependent on the initial theoretical element, and it is this analysis which is less
convincing, weakening the whole.The ¢rst three chapters present a collection of
leading jurisprudential studies, mostly from a critical perspective, but the rela-
tionship between these studies and their authors is not fully developed. For exam-
ple, the ¢rst chapter selects the jurisprudential narratives from which the book’s
normative contentions are drawn. This is indeed a di⁄cult methodological task
as there exists a plethora of articulate debates on constitutional rights and princi-
ples. This is explicitly acknowledged by Zucca, but the text fails to engage with
the additional layer of complexity that the aspirations of the study require.
In a comparative study, the assumption is that constitutional rights such as the
right to life have universal valence and that their role in a constitutional system is
related to legal traditions. In other words, the universal valence of rights is unpro-
blematic, relatively speaking, as long as the concept of ‘the people’remains equally
universal, unquali¢ed and inclusive. However, a recent stream of constitutional
studies (e.g. Loughlin, Brudner) suggest that modern constitutional principles
are embedded in social, political and institutional contexts which ¢ll these uni-
versal theoretical concepts with their normative signi¢cance.Thus, not only is the
social context relevant for interpreting constitutional principles, but it also
changes the actual normative signi¢cance of those legal assumptions. In other
words, the interaction between universalism and social context has a methodolo-
gical impact on the twofold task of qualifying the normative principles which
underpin modern constitutional theory and on incorporating claims based on
divergent interpretations of those principles. Unfortunately, Constitutional Dilem-
mas appears to acknowledge this methodological requirement of modern com-
parative studies only in its legal analyses, whereas in the ¢rst part it rather
collates theoretical arguments by making selective choices from studies made
from very di¡erent legal cultures such as those of Dworkin and Alexy. In addi-
tion, Zucca’s critical analysis of Dworkin’s theory of rights, which informs much
British and American legal doctrine, remains unarticulated and his second chap-
ter’s ‘stipulative’ de¢nitions of fundamental rights appear not to be fully connected
with the preceding analytical work.
It is in the second part of the book that the author’s narrative changes both sty-
listically and substantively. Zucca here provides an excellent comparative analysis
to counter endowed constitutional interpretative practices, moving from the
‘right answer thesis’ to revealing the ¢ctitious structure of some hierarchical taxo-
nomies of rights. Throughout this section, Zucca maintains a series of coherent
arguments which are interwoven with sophisticated technical analyses based on
awide range of judicial and doctrinal reviews. Central to Zucca’s second section is
the question of how to accommodate fundamental rights con£icts into a dynamic
constitutional system. One of the most signi¢cant corollaries of this point is how
the epistemic judicial practices might be developed into a system of secondary
rules which, if it cannot dissipate the normative tension created by claims based
on con£icting rights (e.g. privacy and freedom of speech) should increase the
transparency of adjudication procedures.
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In conclusion, there are a few elements in this text that should be read with a
rhetorical pinch of salt, especially when Zucca departs from his comparative ana-
lysis and criticises jurisprudential authors at the expenses of the clarity of his own
argument. But these are minor concerns which do not detract from the overall
quality of what is, ¢nally, a highly sophisticated comparative analysis. Constitu-
tional Dilemmas is to be strongly recommended as an addition to the library of
constitutional lawyers and public law theorists, whomight usefully insert extracts
into the reading lists for their postgraduate seminars.
Vito Bredan
George Pavlakos, Our Knowledge of the Law: Objectivity and Practice in
LegalTheory,Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, 267 pp, hb d37.80.
When a judge sentences or when legal o⁄cials apply the law, are they merely
following legal conventions or are they attempting to grasp legal facts? Do we
know legal facts in the same way that we have come to know natural facts? It is
arguable that we cannot because natural facts are known to us through experi-
ments, observations, generalizations and explanatory laws and so on, whereas
legal facts guide our actions and are therefore normative in character. The law
makes demands upon us, it commands us to take certain actions and it proscribes
certain others. Since legal facts belong to the domain of reasons and norms, unlike
natural facts which belong to the domain of causes, how then can we identify
them ^ and identifying them, apply them?
These questions are at the heart of Pavlakos’ book Our Knowledge of the Law:
Objectivity and Practice in Legal Theory and he argues that contemporary legal
theories have provided unsatisfactory responses to it. On one hand, Hart’s legal
theory, Pavlakos says, replaces legal facts with conventionalist criteria ‘by repre-
senting legal practice as a £at enterprise which is exhausted by facts of behaviour
identi¢ed through a secondary rule of obligation’ (185). On the other hand, Pavla-
kos says that Dworkin’s legal theory adheres to a dualist understanding of legal
facts, which asserts that legal propositions are true in virtue of an independent
reality (198). For Dworkin, according to Pavlakos, legal knowledge can be
obtained because there are legal facts, characterized as properties in the world,
independent of our language and practices. He argues, furthermore, that Dwor-
kin cannot explain how these properties are individuated and they must, there-
fore, remain mysterious (204).We can say that this interpretation amounts to an
essentialist reading of Dworkin’s notion of objectivity. But is this an accurate read-
ing? In his article‘Truth andObjectivity;You’dBetter Believe It’ ((1996)Philosophy
and Public A¡airs 87), Dworkin explicitly rejects objectivity grounded on ‘essential
properties’ and asserts that the idea of normative objects and properties impinging
upon us is ludicrous and mysterious. It appears, then, that Pavlakos’ view of
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